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Effect of R&D and Market Concentration on Merger Outcomes – An Event Study 
of U.S. Horizontal Mergers  
Abstract 
 
This study examines the pattern of abnormal returns for merging companies and rivals 
to determine investor expectations regarding the impact of horizontal mergers challenged by the 
government.  Prior studies have indicated that the government may have challenged efficiency-
enhancing mergers as evidenced by the pattern of abnormal returns to rivals during merger 
events.  This study examines those patterns using challenged mergers from 1997 to 2007, and it 
adds to the literature by assessing the effect that R&D intensity and change in HHI have on the 
returns to rivals and merging firms.  The paper finds that the pattern of abnormal returns is a 
result of the different effects that antitrust complaints and merger outcomes have on rivals based 
on R&D intensity and change in industry concentration.  This finding suggests that the 
government may have been properly vigilant in challenging mergers over the past 10 years in 
basic industries that have high levels of market concentration.  However, it also may have 
allowed collusive mergers to proceed in R&D intensive industries. 
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Concerns over market concentration have historically been the primary focus of 
U.S. anti merger policy.  The rationale behind these fears is that higher market share 
leads to market power and thus pricing power.  Yet, over the past thirty years the U.S. 
Department of Justice and federal courts have placed less emphasis on market 
concentration in lieu of other factors (e.g. ease of entry, efficiencies, innovation) in 
deciding whether or not to challenge a merger.  Their rationale changed, according to 
Baker and Shapiro (2007), from the 1960s when a strong structural presumption of 
horizontal merger analysis virtually precluded a merger among rivals to the 1990s when 
evidence of market concentration was considered merely a starting point for merger 
inquiry.   
Some economists view the decline in merger challenges and injunctions as an 
indication of a failure in regulatory policy, while others believe that it shows the success 
of the Hart Scott Rodino (“HSR
2”) Act and the recent merger guidelines.   Those that 
take the latter view believe that the government challenges fewer mergers because the 
rules regarding acceptable horizontal mergers are more clearly enumerated than ever 
before.   
                                                 
2 The HSR Act requires specific filings for all mergers over a certain size threshold.  This 
amount, which is adjusted annually based on the change in the gross national product, is $65.2 million as of 
February, 2009. After receiving the initial filings, the government then has 30 days to request additional 
information if the transaction appears to present anti competitive problems.  The request for additional 
information is referred to as a 2
nd request and typically extends the waiting period an additional 30 days.  
The government may then choose to allow the merger, seek injunctive relief, or negotiate a settlement that 





Several economists (e.g. Eckbo, Stillman, and Schumann) have sought to test 
the effectiveness of merger policy using financial event studies.  This technique isolates 
the effect of specific events on a stock price versus the performance of the overall market.  
Some of these studies examine the effect of a merger event on the stock market returns of 
competitors, under the hypothesis that if the merger is likely to result in higher (lower) 
product prices then the returns to competitors would increase (decrease).  Many of these 
event studies were done after the HSR Act was passed in 1979 to test the effectiveness of 
the Act.  More recent merger studies have focused on mergers in specific industries, such 
as oil and gas, pharmaceutical, and banking.   
This study assesses the abnormal returns that result from a set of 86 mergers 
challenged by the government for concentration concerns between 1997 and 2007.  This 
study is unique in that it examines not only the effect that merger events have on the 
abnormal returns but also how these returns vary with the level of R&D intensity and 
market concentration.  The hypothesis is that change in market concentration and R&D 
intensity will be positively (negatively) correlated with abnormal returns to merging 
firms and rivals as events increase (decrease) the likelihood of a horizontal merger 
occurring.   
This paper is organized as follows:  there is a literature review section that 
provides an overview of financial event studies and their use in analyzing the 
effectiveness of antitrust activity.  The literature review also examines the relationship 
between R&D and market concentration.  This is followed by sections covering the data 
set and the event study methodologies employed.  The paper concludes with the results, 





2. Literature Review 
Fama et al (1969) was one of the first researchers to use a financial event study 
to detail investor expectations regarding a particular event.   Fama et al (1969) studied the 
effect that a stock split has on stock market returns by correlating the log of a firm’s stock 
market return to the log of the overall market return with the estimated residuals in a 
particular window reflecting the expectation of the stock split.  The authors find 
unusually high returns on stock prices in the months preceding stock splits.   
Ellert (1976) was the first to use the event study technique to examine the 
impact of mergers challenged by the DOJ or FTC on investor returns.  He finds merging 
firms earned a 23% abnormal return in the event window versus the expected return for 
these firms based on their stock market performance in the previous eight years.  He also 
finds a 2% decline the merging firms’ return in the month after the merger challenge 
announcement.  Ellert (1976) concludes that mergers help reallocate resources, but he 
does not indicate the source of the abnormal returns. 
This was left to Eckbo (1983) and Stillman (1983) who both tested how a 
horizontal merger affected the abnormal returns of rivals.  Their premise, which is termed 
the market power hypothesis, is that investors will bid up the stock price of rivals if they 
expect market participants to gain market power after the horizontal merger.  Eckbo 
(1983) finds that the stock returns of acquired companies and competitors show 
significant positive responses to the merger announcement; however, he does not find a 




contends, that collusion and anti-competitive effects are not implied by the regulatory 
challenge. 
Eckbo and Weir (1985) then add to the literature by using the event study to 
examine the effectiveness of the 1978 HSR Act.  The authors use a sample of 82 mergers 
challenged by the government for competition concerns and examine how acquirers’, 
acquisition candidates, and rivals’ abnormal stock market returns reacted to the merger 
announcement, merger challenge, and the final decision regarding the merger.   
The authors employ the following equation to assess abnormal returns. 
Ri =α + βiRm + γiD + έi                    ( 1 )  
In this equation, Ri is the vector of daily compounded returns to the bidder firm, 
target firms, and an equally weighted portfolio of rival firms.  Rm is the value-weighted 
market index, and D is the vector containing values of ones for days in the event period 
and zeros otherwise.  As such, γi represents the abnormal returns associated with the 
event. 
Eckbo and Weir (1985) analyzed these results to assess whether the merger was 
collusive or efficiency-enhancing.   It would be considered collusive via the market 
power hypothesis if the combined firm would be more likely to generate higher profits by 
gaining control of pricing.  The merger would be considered efficiency enhancing if the 
combined entity could lower its costs through the merger.  The key to the study is 
determining the pattern of investor reactions to events that increase or detract from the 




The following chart shows the theory and rationale that Eckbo and Weir (1985) 
use to explain a pattern of abnormal returns from probability enhancing or decreasing 
events. 
 
Table 1:  Expected Sign of Abnormal Returns and Rationale per Event Type 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
 
In considering probability enhancing events that the merger will be approved 
(the merger announcement or pro-defendant decision) Eckbo & Weir (1985) theorize that 
the returns to merging firms would increase due to the market power gains, increased 
efficiencies, or the improved use of existing resources.  Since returns to acquiring firms 
are predicted to be always positive (negative) relative to probability-enhancing 
(decreasing) events, they do not provide information regarding the rationale behind the 
merger.  
In contrast, a pattern of abnormal returns to competitors are more informative 
since they might be negative or positive in response to merger events.    Eckbo and Weir 
(1985) posit that positive returns to competitors regarding probability-enhancing events 
would indicate investors’ belief that competitors should benefit from the merger due to 
the increased prices that would ensue.  Alternatively, negative returns to competitors 
might imply that the merged firm with their enhanced market power would initiate a price 
war that would hurt competitors.  Another explanation for competitor returns declining is 
that the merger results in a more productive firm, which adversely affects competitors.  




abnormal returns due to the information or signaling that the merger provides of 
increased demand for resources owned by rivals.   
Efficient mergers, the authors contend, can, therefore “have simultaneously 
productivity and information effects,” so one still may not be able to assess investor 
reaction to the merger. (Eckbo and Weir, 1985)  They solve the problem by looking to the 
complaint, which they state can help rivals by lessoning the danger of an efficiency 
enhancing event, but does not lessen the value of the information contained in the merger.  
Eckbo and Weir (1985), therefore, argue that if abnormal returns to rivals are non-
negative to both probability-enhancing and decreasing-events, then the results indicate an 
efficiency enhancing merger.  
Eckbo and Weir (1985) find positive, significant abnormal returns to the target 
firm during the merger announcement and pro-defendant merger outcome events and 
negative, significant abnormal returns during the merger complaint and pro-government 
outcome events.  Regarding rivals, the authors find positive significant abnormal returns 
in the merger announcement window, but insignificant abnormal returns during other 
merger events.  The authors interpret the results as showing that the HSR act did not 
positively affect the government’s selection of only collusive mergers to challenge.  They 
justified their conclusion by the fact that the returns to rivals appear unaffected by the 
merger complaint or outcome.  If the market power hypothesis held, they theorize, then 
the coefficient of the abnormal returns to competitors for the merger complaint would be 
negative as they found but significant, and the abnormal returns to rivals would be 
positive (negative) and significant if the case were dismissed (merger canceled).  They 




returns to rivals relative to the merger complaint and outcome to imply that the gains 
from the merger do not depend on the merger’s survival.  Therefore, they conclude that 
the merger announcement conveyed information regarding potential efficiencies 
benefiting other firms in the industry as well as the merging firms. 
 
2.1 Critique of Event Studies 
A critical part of the financial event study for antitrust purposes is the analysis 
of rivals’ stock market returns during the merger event windows.  The primary critique 
made by Werden and Williams (1989) is that rivals often derive a small portion of their 
revenue from the market affected by the merger.  Rivals are usually multi-product firms 
that are dissimilar in size to the merged firm.  Therefore, perhaps Eckbo and Weir’s 
(1985) findings that the abnormal returns of competitors were insignificant implied that 
the competitors were unaffected by the merger rather than indicating the mergers were 
efficiency-enhancing.  
A similar critique is that there may be other events affecting rivals (e.g. 
financial reporting) during the event window that cause their stock prices to fluctuate.   It 
is also difficult to find the proper rivals to use, since some are private or multi product 
firms with the specific affected market (s) buried in their results.  Thus, there may simply 
be too much noise in the stock market price of rivals for the study to be valid.  Eckbo and 
Weir (1985) respond that they found a significant response to the announcement to rivals’ 
stock market prices, which would indicate that there is a correlation in how investors 





2.2 Two Stage Model Using Change in HHI 
Schumann (1993) added to Eckbo and Weir’s (1985) study by assessing the 
relationship between market concentration and the abnormal returns in horizontal 
mergers.  Schumann (1993) examined 37 mergers that were challenged by the FTC 
between 1981 and 1987 for concentration concerns.  Schumann’s (1993) results were 
similar to Eckbo and Weir’s (1985) as he found rivals’ abnormal returns to be 
significantly affected by the merger announcement but not by the merger complaint.   
However, his interpretation of the results differs as he concluded that the effect on 
competition varies with the market share of the rival.   
 To test his theory, Schumann (1993) added a second step to the event study 
model to correlate rivals’ abnormal returns to an event to their market share and industry 
concentration.  His rationale is that if efficiencies result from a merger of smaller rivals, 
the antitrust complaint may increase the probability that smaller rivals will be acquired by 
preventing the merger of larger rivals (termed the “in play” hypothesis).   He adds that 
the merger complaint can also protect smaller rivals from the potential efficiency gains 
that would be achieved from merging larger rivals (called the “disadvantaged small firm” 
hypothesis).  Therefore, if investors expect a merger to have the countervailing effects of 
creating efficiencies and reducing competition, then a merger complaint might reduce the 
returns to large competitors and increase the returns to small competitors for the reasons 
cited above.  These two effects could result in insignificant abnormal returns to rivals 
relative to an antitrust complaint. 
To test his hypothesis, Schumann finds 97 rivals of the merging firms and ranks 




in the quartile with the lowest market share have large, positive, significant abnormal 
returns, while the rivals with the highest market share have negative, significant abnormal 
returns.  The abnormal returns to rivals in the second and third quartiles were not 
significant.   
Schumann (1993) also sought to examine the relationship between industry 
concentration and rivals’ abnormal returns relative to the merger complaint using the 
following model:   
(Rivals)CARim = C1 + C2(Rivals)MKTSHRim + C3∆HHIm + C4(∆HHIm)
2 + έ       (2) 
Rivals’ CAR refers to the cumulative abnormal returns to rivals while 
MKTSHRim refers to the rivals’ market share in the affected market.  Schumann (1993) 
predicts a non-linear effect of industry concentration on rivals’ abnormal returns.  He 
explains that if a change in HHI is low then neither the “in play” nor “disadvantaged 
small firm” effect are relevant.  Also, if there are small changes in HHI, this signals the 
government will challenge the merger of small firms.  For this reason, he expects Rivals’ 
abnormal returns to be positively correlated to small changes in HHI.  However, he 
expects large changes in HHI to have a negative effect on the CAR of rivals relative to 
the merger complaint because of the market power effect, which would hurt both large 
and small rivals.   
Schumann (1993) finds that the coefficients of change in HHI and market share 
to be positively correlated to rivals’ CAR, which he views as supporting his hypothesis.  
He concludes that the pattern of abnormal returns he observed to be consistent both with 
the mergers creating efficiencies as Eckbo and Weir (1985) reported and also lessening 





2.3 Innovation and Market Concentration 
The next question to explore in the literature is the relationship between 
innovation, firm size, market concentration, and abnormal returns.   The correlation of 
firm size to innovation and market concentration to innovation were first theorized by 
Schumpeter (1950) and Galbraith (1957).  There are many potential explanations of the 
innovation-firm size correlation including 1) R&D projects involve large fixed costs that 
can only be covered if sales are sufficiently large (Syrneonidis, 1996), 2) Economies of 
scale and scope in the production of innovation are needed (Syrneonidis, 1996), 3) 
Capital market imperfections confer an advantage to large firms in securing financing for 
risky R&D projects (Cohen et al 1987), and 4) R&D is more productive in large firms 
due to complementarities between R&D and other non-manufacturing activities (e.g. 
finance and marketing)  (Cohen et al 1987). 
In addition, Syrneonidis (1996) argues that innovative activity may be higher in 
concentrated industries because firms with greater market power can more easily garner 
the returns from innovation and thus have more incentive to innovative.  The argument is 
that patents become more valuable with greater market power.  In addition, he contends 
that with market power, a firm may gain from innovation as it can benefit from various 
mechanisms to assure appropriability, such as learning by doing, control of the 





2.4 Effect of Horizontal Mergers on R&D
3 
Economists, such as Hitt, Hoskinsson, and Ireland (1990), argue that a negative 
relationship exists between horizontal mergers and R&D activities largely because firms 
engage in mergers in part to substitute acquisition for R&D investment.  Their rationale is 
that acquisitions provide a more certain return on investment than R&D.   Hitt et al 
(1990) also contend that post merger there is a decline in the willingness of managers to 
allocate resources and champion activities that lead to the development of new products, 
technologies, and processes consistent with marketplace opportunities. 
Others, such as Ahuja and Katila (2001) and Capron (1999), believe that 
horizontal mergers should cause R&D intensity of the merged firm to increase.  They 
contend that M&A activity increases the available knowledge base in a firm and provides 
complementary technological resources and capabilities.    
Finally, some researchers, such as Hall (1990), found little change in R&D 
activity post merger unless there was considerable leverage in effectuating the merger.  In 
this case the merger resulted in reduced R&D activity.  
 
3. The Data Set 
The dataset for the dissertation includes 87 horizontal mergers from 1997 to 2007 
that were challenged by the FTC or DOJ for violation of the Clayton Act Section VII b for 
excess concentration.   During this 11 year time period 742 2nd requests per the HSR Act 
were issued, and 440 proposed mergers were publicly challenged by the Department of 
Justice and FTC (208 were publicly challenged by the Department of Justice and 232 were 
                                                 
   
3 This issue is explored further in Ralph Sonenshine’s paper, “The Impact of Horizontal Mergers 




challenged by the FTC).   “Challenged mergers” refer to mergers that are publicly 
challenged by the government after a HSR 2nd request.  I use this data set, since it 
represents horizontal mergers that the government has determined to involve significant 
increases in market concentration
4. 
The following chart shows the number of 2
nd requests and challenged mergers that 
occurred from 1997 to 2007
5 per the HSR Act. 
Table 2:  Breakdown of 2
nd Requests and Merger Challenges  
 
Insert table here 
 
 
Typically, per the merger review process, approximately 1,750 to 2,000 mergers 
are reviewed a year.  Roughly 95% of the mergers are cleared during the 30 day waiting 
period as detailed in the HSR act and subsequent merger guidelines.  2nd requests are 
issued by the FTC and DOJ for the other 5% of mergers if the government believes there 
is a strong possibility that the transaction may be in violation of antitrust laws.  The 
parties then submit further documentation, and the government decides whether to 
challenge formally the merger.  When a merger is publicly challenged a complaint and / 
or competitive impact statement is issued.  These documents include evidence, such as 
market share, market concentration, and the definition of the contested market (See 
Appendix A for a list of challenged mergers used in this study).    
                                                 
4 Mergers involving private companies, product lines, or divisions of public companies could 
not be included because data was pulled from SEC filings.  In addition, I needed mergers that occurred 
fairly recently, because SEC filings become harder to gather the further back in time one goes. 
 
5 The numbers in the chart were taken from public filing reports found on the DOJ and FTC web 




Mergers were deemed to have been challenged by the Federal Trade 
Commission or the Department of Justice if a complaint was filed in court or a press 
release was issued announcing that the transaction had been abandoned or restructured in 
response to the Department’s concerns.
6   In these cases a complaint and / or competitive 
impact statement is issued, which often includes information regarding market 
concentration, market share, and the relevant market behind the merger challenge. 
For each merger, stock market returns were collected from the acquired firm, 
acquirer, and two competitive firms (when available).  Rivals were selected first if they 
were mentioned in the merger complaint documents.  For most mergers rivals were not 
specifically identified; in these cases competitors were selected from company reports 
(e.g. annual reports and 10-ks) or from specific listings, such as Hoover’s Company 
Reports.  Data were gathered on 114 rivals.
7  Information on two or more competitors 
was not available for all mergers because 1) some competitors are private or foreign, 
where stock market returns are not available or 2) there may not have been any 
competitors in the affected market because the merger consisted of the only two 
companies in the market. 
Information regarding the weighted change in HHI was also collected for each 
merger.   This amount was calculated by taking the percent of a firm’s most recent annual 
sales that the product line (s) of concern for excess concentration represents and 
multiplying by the change in HHI as noted in the competitive impact statements or 
                                                 
6 See http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/12/mdp.pdf for the full explanation of challenged mergers. 
 







8   In many cases the weighted average change in HHI included many product 
lines.
 9  Mergers are challenged based on change in HHI and HHI levels.  I chose to use 
change in HHI as it more accurately reflects the incremental benefit that an acquirer 
might be gaining from the acquisition.   In addition, change in HHI is more available in 
the public documents than HHI level. 
Average R&D intensity (R&D expense divided by sales) was also collected for 
each acquired firm.  The average R&D intensity for the two years prior to the merger was 
used.  R&D intensities were obtained from company financial statements.    R&D 
intensity as well as change in HHI is used in the second stage regression to assess the 
correlation between the abnormal returns to the merged firm and rivals in the merger 
event to these two covariates. 
 
4. Event Study Approach 
I conducted the event study using a two stage technique.  In the first stage, I 
determined the abnormal returns during a specified event window for each company for 
each event.  Merger events are the announcement, complaint, and merger outcome.   
Companies include the target firm, the acquirer, and two competitors.  The approach for 
                                                 
8 These documents list either the change in HHI, which is the product of the firms’ market shares, 
or the market shares of the firms of interest. 
9 Weighted average change in HHI in some of the mergers is difficult to calculate because 1) in 
some cases merger were challenged for excess in concentration in the U.S., but the firm’s sales are global.  
In these cases, I assumed in some cases that the concentration levels in the U.S. applied globally as well.  In 
other cases I weighted change in HHI by U.S. sales.  Also, there were cases (particularly with 
telecommunications mergers) in which the challenge was based on regional market shares and sales were 
not available for the region.  In these cases I estimated regional sales on customer base or population level.  
Finally, implicit in the weighted change in HHI technique is that the company’s product line sales that were 
not challenged result in zero change in market concentration from the merger.    Although this may often 
not be the case, the assumption is still valid because the government, who has supposedly sifted through the 






calculating the abnormal returns is based on MacKinlay’s (1997) technique whereby the 
actual stock market return during the event window for each company is compared to the 
expected return as follows: 
ARit = Rit – E(Rit|Xt)                     (2) 
where ARit, Rit, and E(Rit|Xi) are the abnormal returns, actual returns, and the expected 
returns for period t.  Xt is the conditioning information for the normal return based on the 
market model, where Xi is the market return.  The market model is the following: 
E(Rit|Xt) = αi + βiRmt    + έit                      (3) 
With E(έit)=0 and var(έit)= σ
 2έi where Rit and Rmt are the period-t returns on security i and 
the market portfolio, respectively.   This approach assumes a stable linear relation 
between the market and a security’s return.  (MacKinlay 1997)   
Rearranging the terms, we get 
   ^   ^ 
ARie =   Rit    – αi     -      βiRmt                                       (4) 
with the variance being. 
         ^ 
Var(AR) = σ
 2 έit + 1[1+(Rmr –μm)
 2]                (5) 
 L    σm
2 
In this equation L is the length of the estimation window, so as L becomes large 
the second term, which accounts for the additional variance in the sampling error of α and 
β approach zero, and the variance of the abnormal return becomes the variance of the 
market model.  The abnormal return for each company (i) is the difference between the 
actual return during the event window (t) for each event (e) and the expected return 




prior to the announcement, to determine the expected return E(Rit|Xt).  I calculate 
abnormal returns for both three (one day prior and one day after the event) and five-day 
(two days prior and two days after the event) event windows.       
The following time line shows the time periods for the events. 
 
 120 days prior                         






t-10 3 day event 
5 day event 
  announcement          complaint           outcome 
I then calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), which are the sum of the 
abnormal returns over the event window.  The sign and significance of the CARs are 
assessed using the following Z score test. 
         ___ 
θ1 =            CAR (t-1, t+1)  ~  N(0,1)               (6) 
                  _______ 
Var( CAR((t-1, t+1))
1/2 
In this equation, the numerator and denominator are the average CARs and 
standard deviation of the average CARs for the three day events.  The same procedure is 
used for the five day events.   
The average CAR is determined as follows: 
             _____            N    ^ 
CAR (t-1, t) = 1 ∑ CAR (t-1, t+1)                        (7) 
      N 
1 
The standard deviation of the average CAR is the following: 
           _____           N     
VAR CAR (t-1, t) = 1   ∑ σ
 2 (t-1, t+1)             ( 8 )  
     N





Abnormal returns were determined for the event window of the announcement, 
complaint, and resolution.  The sign and significance of the cumulative abnormal returns 
for each type of company (acquired firm, acquirer, and rivals) indicate investor 
expectations regarding the results of the merger.  That is, if the returns to the target, the 
acquirer, and rivals are positive and significant when the event enhances the probability 
of the merger occurring then investors appear to view the mergers as collusive.  If 
abnormal returns follow the opposite pattern then this might indicate that the government 
has primarily challenged efficiency-enhancing mergers. 
For each event window, I will also run a regression to determine how R&D-
intensity of the acquired firm and change in HHI from the merger impact the abnormal 
return of the company during the event window.    
 ^ 
CARie = β1 + β2ln∆HHIm + β3lnRi + έ           ( 9 )  
In this reduced form equation i refers to the acquisition candidate and m indexes 
the industry.  The variables were expressed in logs for all covariates to assess a non-linear 
relationship.  If the coefficient of change in HHI is positive and significant for the merged 
firm and rivals during probability enhancing events, this would lend support to the market 
power hypothesis since as industry concentration increases, the merged firm and rivals 
will benefit by being able to price above marginal cost.  
Equation 9 also examines the effect that R&D intensity of the target has on 
abnormal returns.  If the coefficient of R&D intensity is positive and significant for the 
merged firm and / or rivals during probability-enhancing events, this would support the 





4.1 Study Questions 
The key questions I am seeking to answer are 1) do returns to rivals relative to 
the merger announcement, complaint, and resolution follow the specific pattern that 
would indicate the government challenges mergers that investors believe to be collusive, 
and 2) are abnormal returns influenced significantly by the level of R&D and market 
concentration?   
There are several potential reasons why investors’ expectations of the future 
value of the acquired firm, acquirer, or rivals might vary with R&D-intensity.   These 
include 1) market power, 2) economies of scale or scope, 3) increased value of intangible 
assets, and 4) spillover effects of R&D.      
The arguments regarding market power is that by reducing competition, the 
merged firm increases its opportunity to monetize R&D via marketing, control of 
distribution channels, etc.  Under this theory the returns to the merged firm would be 
positive and the returns to rivals would be negative with probability enhancing events. 
Regarding economies of scale or scope, the rationale is that the merged firm can 
lower its cost per innovative output by increasing its efficiency, diversifying its efforts, or 
reducing its costs.  Under this theory the returns to the merged firm would be positive and 




Investors might also bid up the merging company or rivals if they believe the 
merger events indicate the increased value of intangible assets
10 in the industry.  Under 
this view the returns to the target and rivals increase with probability enhancing events. 
R&D investments can also result in spillover to other companies, and the 
merged firm may not be able to capture the value from its R&D activity as rivals will 
quickly copy the results and/or hire managers from the merged firm.  The result is that 
investors believe the acquirer overpaid for the merger causing the abnormal returns to the 
target to decline and abnormal returns to rivals to be insignificant and/or zero. 
The following chart shows the theory and rationale that would explain a pattern 
of abnormal returns related to R&D intensity.  
 




Insert table here 
 
 
In addition to performing separate regressions on each event, I also ran a 
combined regression to test the sign and significance of each event as wells as the two 
covariates (change in HHI and R&D-intensity) interacted with the events in one model as 
follows:    
  ^ 
CARie  =  β1Event1  +  β2Event2  +  β3Event3  +  β4(ln∆HHIm*Event1) + β5(lnRi*Event1) + 
β6(ln∆HHIm*Event2) + β8(ln∆HHIm*Event3) + β9(lnRi*Event3) + έ i                    (10) 
                                                 
10 Includes both legal intangibles, such as patents, trademarks, and other forms of goodwill, and 




The CARs of interest are the target firm and the portfolio of rivals.   Events one, 
two, and three refer to the three to five day window surrounding the announcement, 
complaint, and outcome respectively.  The other terms are interaction variables between the 
event and the log of R&D-intensity or the log of change in HHI.  By using this model I can 
examine the sign and significance of the three events at one time, with a larger number of 
degrees of freedom. 
The null hypothesis of the event study is that the abnormal returns will be 
normally distributed with zero mean and thus the event has no statistical impact on the 
behavior of abnormal returns.  If the event (s) has a statistical impact on the returns of the 
firms, then do they follow in such a way to validate or contradict the collusion or efficiency 
hypotheses?  The second null hypothesis is that there is no difference in abnormal returns 
for acquirers, acquirers, and competitors relative to changes in industry concentration from 
the merger or the R&D intensity of the acquired firm.   
 
5. Results 
This section covers results from the first and second stage regressions run for the 
announcement, complaint, and resolution.  Results were shown for three day CARs (-1,1) 
and five day CARs (-2,2) for each event.  It also includes results from the combined 
regression covering all events.   
5.1 Announcement 
Table 3:  Results - Abnormal Returns to Announcements  
 





The results in table three show that investors bid up the acquisition target 22.6% 
and 22.9% during the three and five day event window surrounding the merger 
announcement.  Abnormal returns to the acquirer were significant and slightly negative 
(1.16% to -1.03%).  These findings are consistent with the returns to the target and bidder 
firms in other studies
11.    
It is not surprising that returns to bidders are small, as there are many cases in 
the data set in which the value of the acquisition target is small, and therefore, not very 
consequential relative to the acquirer’s value.  Also, studies have shown that abnormal 
returns to acquirers are very sensitive to the financing methods (e.g. announcement of 
new equity issuance).  (Jarrell and Paulson, 1989)  Finally, Jarrell and Paulson (1989) add 
that in cases where there is competition between bidders, any excess return will certainly 
go to the target. 
To assess investor expectations of the competitive impact of the merger, 
abnormal returns of rivals are examined.  The cumulative abnormal returns of rivals were 
approximately .5% and significant at the 10% level in the three and five day windows.  
This finding appears to fit the pattern of the market power hypothesis under the theory 
that abnormal returns to rivals are based on investor expectations that rivals would gain 
pricing power as a result of industry consolidation.   However, the abnormal returns to 
rivals are small and only significant to the 10% level so there could certainly be other 
factor (s) influencing investor behavior.  To further examine the effect of market 
concentration as well as R&D intensity on the abnormal returns of rivals, acquisition 
                                                 
11 For example, Eckbo and Weir (1985) also found a 20% to 25% abnormal return during the 





targets, and bidders, a second stage regression per equation 10 was performed.  The 






Table 4:  Results - Abnormal Returns to Announcement Due to Change in HHI 
 and R&D Intensity for 3 Day CARs 
 















Table 5:  Results - Abnormal Returns to Announcement Due to Change in HHI 
 and R&D Intensity for 5 Day CARs 
 
Insert table 5 here 
 
These results may indicate that change in HHI positively affects the abnormal 
returns of the target as the coefficient was significant to the 1% level in the three and five 
day event windows.
12  This would provide some evidence that as the industry becomes 
more concentrated investors believe the value of the merger increases, perhaps due to 
market power.  However, log change in HHI was not significant relative to abnormal 
returns of acquirers or rivals, which one would expect if the market power hypothesis 
held. 
Regarding R&D, there is also some indication that the higher the target’s R&D-
intensity the greater is the target’s value, as the coefficients for log R&D intensity in the 
                                                 
12 The significance level for the 3 day event window for change in HHI for the bidder firm was 




three and five day events are positive and significant to the 5% level.  However, the 
coefficient for R&D intensity to the bidder firm is not significant. This finding differs 
from how investors react to rivals with the merger complaint and resolution. 
 
5.2 Merger Complaint / Resolution 
For the 87 horizontal mergers challenged, 65 cases had complaints and 
preliminary orders filed simultaneously.  Therefore, although a complaint was filed, 
investors appear to react to the preliminary resolution of the merger.  In most of these 65 
cases, the merger was approved subject to an asset divestiture.  In a few other cases the 
merger was approved without any changes required.   
The following series of charts show the results of the two stage regressions for 
the 65 cases when the mergers were approved and 20 cases when complaints were filed 
and the merger resolutions occurred at a later date.
13  In the 20 cases when a preliminary 
merger outcome did not occur simultaneously with a complaint, six of the mergers were 
abandoned or rejected, 14 of the mergers were approved subject to divestitures or 
changes that were filed after the complaint was lodged. 
Table 6:  Results - Abnormal Returns to the Merger Complaint / Resolution 
 
 
Insert table 6 here 
 
 
The abnormal returns to the target when the merger is approved are significant 
but fairly small (approximately 1.5%); the abnormal returns are negative, significant and 
fairly large (approximately -5%) when the complaint is issued and the merger is not 
                                                 
13 Stock market returns were not obtained for one of the mergers because the complaint occurred 




simultaneously approved.  Investors may be expecting the mergers to get approved 
subject to a modification, so when the preliminary approval is issued, investor response 
to the target firm is muted, but when there is no preliminary resolution, implying that the 
merger may not get approved in any form, the investor response is very negative. 
Abnormal returns to bidders were negative and significant for the three day 
event window when the merger is issued and not simultaneously approved. Abnormal 
returns to bidders are not significant when the merger is approved.  Like with the 
abnormal returns to the target firm, this result may indicate that investors believe the 
mergers will get approved; thus, investors are negatively surprised when complaints are 
issued and not simultaneously resolved. 
Abnormal returns to rivals are small and not significant both when the merger is 
approved and when the complaint is issued and the merger is not resolved.  The merger 
impact from the abnormal returns to rivals is, therefore, unclear.  To assess the merger 
impact, a regression is performed correlating rivals’ abnormal returns to R&D intensity 
and change in HHI. 
Table 7:  Results - Abnormal Returns to the Merger Complaint / Resolution 




Insert table 7 here 
 
Table 8:  Results - Abnormal Returns to the Merger Complaint / Resolution 
Relative to Change in HHI and R&D for 5 Day CARs 
 
 





Returns to rivals in response to the merger resolution were positively correlated 
with log R&D-intensity.  The positive, significant coefficient for log R&D means that 
investors bid up the stock price of competitors relative to the target’s R&D intensity in 
response to the merger resolution.  This provides further evidence of investors’ 
expectations that the approval of the horizontal merger will help rivals in R&D intensive 
industries.  This may indicate that rivals can engage in their own merger activity, but it is 
interesting that R&D intensity was not clearly significant relative to rivals’ abnormal 
returns at the time of merger announcement.  Other potential explanations as to why 
rivals’ abnormal returns appear positively correlated with R&D intensity include:  1) the 
merger increases the value of intangible assets in the industry, 2) the merger improves the 
market position of rivals due to the divestitures required by the government of the 
merging firms, as the required divestitures reduce the concentration of the R&D assets, 3) 
rivals will benefit from the reduction in R&D activity of the merged firm, and 4) rivals 
will benefit from spillovers from R&D investments by the merged firm. 
With the merger complaint, returns to rivals were also negatively correlated to 
change in HHI, while R&D intensity was not significant.  This finding supports the 
market power hypothesis as returns to rivals are negatively impacted by the merger 
complaint when change in HHI rises.   Per the market power hypothesis, investors will 
bid down the stock price of rivals, if the government disallows the merger, because 
competitors will not gain pricing power from industry consolidation.     
Finally, we see abnormal returns to bidders being negatively correlated to log 
R&D.  Similarly, abnormal returns to targets are negatively correlated though not quite 




such, there was no response relative to bidders and the target when the merger was 
approved.  However, when the complaint was issued and no resolution occurred, then 
investors may have been surprised and bid down the stocks of bidders. 
In summary, if the merger complaint is lodged with a decision pending at a later 
date, then abnormal returns to rivals are slightly negative and negatively correlated with 
the change in industry consolidation that would occur from the merger.  If the complaint 
and preliminary resolution occur simultaneously, as is usually the case, then the abnormal 
returns to rivals were not significant, most likely because the merger resolution was 
expected.  However, abnormal returns to rivals were positively correlated with the 
target’s R&D intensity, which may be based on the reduction in competition in R&D 
efforts in the industry resulting from the merger.  The results could also indicate that the 
potential for market collusion increases the value of R&D-intensity among rivals. 
 
5.3 Pattern of Abnormal Returns by Event 
Table 9:  Results – Pattern of Abnormal Returns by Event among Merging Firms 
and Rivals 





From these findings we see that cumulative abnormal returns to rivals are 
significant to the announcement but not to the merger resolution or complaint.  As such, 
they do not appear to fit the pattern of the market power hypothesis since they are 




results, however, as indicating that investors believe the mergers will ultimately get 
approved. 
There also appears to be different factors affecting rivals during the merger 
events.   With the merger announcement, abnormal returns to rivals are not affected by 
the target’s R&D intensity or the projected change in HHI.  In contrast, rivals’ abnormal 
returns increase with change in R&D intensity during the pro-defendant merger 
resolution and decrease with change in HHI during the merger complaint.  Clearly, these 
findings indicate that rivals are affected by the merger events in dissimilar ways.   
To look at the findings further, the average change in HHI was calculated for 
pro-defendant merger resolutions and complaints.  These amounts were separated into 
R&D-intensive and non-R&D intensive industries as follows:   
 
Table 10:  Results - Average Change in HHI by Merger Event and R&D Intensity 
 
 





From this chart we see a high change in HHI amount (358) in pro-defendant 
merger resolutions with high R&D intensity and a high change in HHI amount (461) 
associated with complaints in low R&D intensive industries.  Therefore, it appears that 
investors are bidding up the stock price of rivals with higher R&D intensity as the merger 
gets approved because these are the mergers with a higher change in HHI.  Yet, it is R&D 
intensity not change in HHI that is positively correlated to the rival’s abnormal returns in 




increased market power that could result from higher market concentration in R&D 
intensive industries.  Perhaps with greater industry concentration rivals will be in a better 
position to monetize their existing R&D investments.   
In contrast, with the merger complaint change in HHI is the highest in non-
R&D intensive industries.  Investors appear to sell off rivals with the merger complaint as 
change in HHI rises.  This is particularly interesting since change in HHI is higher in 
non-R&D intensive industries for merger complaints than R&D intensive industries.  In 
non-R&D intensive industries, where technology generally has less influence on market 
structure, rivals gains significantly from increased market concentration.  Therefore, any 
event, such as the merger complaint, that can lead to lower industry concentration will 





5.3 Change in HHI and R&D Intensity per Event 
Table 11:  Results – Abnormal Returns Per Event Relative to the Change in HHI 













These findings indicate that event dummies are not significant with the 
exception of the 5-day window with the merger resolution.  This result is surprising for 
the target since the target’s abnormal returns (the Z scores) were significant in each event 
in the two stage regression.   This would indicate that the investor expectations of the 
merger outcome hinge on the interaction of the merger event with factors like R&D and 
market concentration. 
The results of table 3.11 show that abnormal returns to the target during the 
announcement window are positively correlated to log change in HHI, which is 
significant to the 1% level.  This result supports the premise that the government is 
properly prosecuting collusive mergers as investors are bidding up the abnormal returns 
to the target as market concentration increases.  Also, the sign and significance in the 5-
day CAR for log change in HHI is negative, which is consistent with the premise that the 
mergers are collusive, as investors are disappointed by the merger challenge.  However, 




may be because the pro-defendant merger resolution was a foregone conclusion, so 
investors did not alter their view of the value of the merger. 
The other key finding is that log R&D for rivals was positive and significant to the 1% 
level when interacting with the merger resolution.  This finding that investor believe 
rivals will benefit from the merger is consistent with the results from the two stage 
regression as shown earlier.    
 
6. Summary 
This paper examines the abnormal stock returns of acquisition targets, bidders, 
and rivals to events surrounding horizontal mergers challenged by the government 
between 1997 and 2007.  I found that the merger announcement leads to large, positive 
abnormal returns to acquisition candidates and small, positive abnormal returns to rivals.  
The announcement also leads to small, negative abnormal returns to bidders.  The merger 
complaint and resolution both lead to small, negative abnormal returns to rivals, which is 
not the pattern expected under the market power hypothesis.   
To understand better the merger impact, the abnormal returns of the merging 
companies and rivals were regressed against change in HHI and R&D intensity.  From 
this analysis, I find that R&D intensity is positively correlated to rivals’ abnormal returns 
during the pro-defendant merger outcome, while change in HHI is negatively correlated 
with the merger complaint.  It also appears that the change in industry concentration 
caused by the merger is higher in R&D-intensive industries in cases when the merger gets 




preliminary approval, the change in industry concentration is highest in non-R&D 
intensive industries.   
In considering the merger complaint, it appears that the government has been 
vigorously prosecuting collusive mergers, since investors react negatively toward rivals 
as industry concentration increases.  This pattern is particularly evident in non-R&D 
intensive industries.  However, the government may also have allowed collusive mergers 
in R&D intensive industries to proceed, given the positive correlation between abnormal 
returns to rivals and R&D intensity in the pro-defendant outcomes.    
It, therefore, appears that merger impacts differ by the type of merger 
challenged.  In industries where companies derive their value primarily from tangible 
assets, market concentration is the critical means to gaining sustainable competitive 
advantage.  In these cases, events that increase (decrease) industry concentration will 
positively (negatively) affect returns to rivals and merging firms.     In industries where 
R&D assets are a major source of competitive advantage, horizontal mergers may 
increase the value of intangible assets for both the merging firms and rivals, so we see 
abnormal returns to rivals correlated with R&D intensity.  It is left to other research to 
determine if the advantages to the industry participants mean a loss to society based on 
higher prices and / or lower levels of R&D, or whether the merger can also increase 







Listing of Mergers 
 
 







1  Chevron –   Texaco  BP & Exxon  78  .4 
2  Shell -   Pennzoil  ASH & Exxon  399  .9 
3  Amgen -   Immunex  J&J & Abbott  592  25.6 
4  Allergan- Inamed  Mentor 57 7 
5  Cephalon -   Cima  Cardinal 20  27.5 
6  Genzyme- ILex  Schering 493 20 
7  Boston Sc. -   Guidant  J&J & Medtronic  566  20.8 
8  Nestle –   Ralston 
Purina  None 189  8 
9  Pfizer -   Pharmacia  Novartis & Wyeth  19  17.7 
10  Sanofi- Aventis Sepracor & Pfizer  43  18 
11  Teva- IVAX  Astra Zeneca & Bristol 109  8.9 
12 
Procter& 
Gamble-  Gillette  Energizer 178 2.1 
13  BP- Amoco  Chevron & Shell  25  .6 
14  BP Amoco -  Arco  Chevron & Exxon  511  .3 
15  Valero- Ultramar Sunoco & Tesoro  116  1.1 
16  Pfizer- Warner  L  GSK & Merck  33  8.6 
17  Rohm Haas  Morton  Compass 131 5.6 
18  Valspar Lilly  Akzo Nobel & 
Sherwin Williams  250 3.3 
19  JDSU Etek  Corning & Optical 
Coating Lab  2214 8.5 
20  Precision Cast Gordon 
Wyman  Howmet 212 3.9 
21  Novartis sub  Eon Labs  Watson & Impax  73  5.8 
22  Zeneca Astra  Abbott 7  18.5 
23  Hoechst  Rhone 
Poulenc  None 8.4  8.7 
24  Penn  Argosy None  352 0 
25  Dow  Union 
Carbide  Exxon & BP  189  3 
26  Oracle  Peoplesoft SAP  629  19 
27  Tyco  Malincrodt None  79  6 
28  Alcan  Pechiney Alcoa  64.7  1 
29  Compuware  Viasoft  Computer Associates 











30  General 
Dynamics  Newport News  Northrop Grumman  1178  .2 
31 United  health  Pacificare Wellpoint  &  Aetna  22.69  0 
32 3D  Systems  DTM Stratasys  1120  9 
33 Alcoa  Reynolds  Alcan & Kaiser  546  .5 
34 Alcoa Alumax  Alcan & Kaiser  45  0 
35 Allied  Signal  Honeywell Litton  97  5.7 
36  Computer 
Associates 
Platinum 
Technologies  Legent 116  34 
37 GE  Instrumentation Aleris & Datascope  339  7.6 
38 Haliburton Dresser Baker  Hughes  5.6  2 
39 Inco  Falconbridge BHP  Billington  143  1 
40 Exxon  Mobil Chevron  &  BP 60  .4 
41 SBC  Ameritech Comcast  151  1 
42 SBC  AT&T Sprint  &  MCI  24  0 
43 Suiza  Broughton none  169  0 
44 JI  Case  Case  Deere & Caterpillar  53  4 
45 Lockheed  Northrop 
Grumman 
Boeing & General 
Dynamics  1135 2 
46 First  Data Concord 
Total System 
Service & National 
CIty 
347 0 
47  L'orleal 
  Carson Revlon 436  0 
48 Monsanto DeKalb 
Genetics  Pioneer -  13 
49  Delhaize 
America  Hannaford No  competitors  386  0 
50  Georgia 
Pacific  Fort James  P&G & Kimberley 
Clark  367 1 
51 Verizon  MCI AT&T 59  .2 
52 Worldcom  Intermedia  Computer Science 
& Hewlett Packard  300 6.4 
53 Worldcom  Sprint AT&T 206  1.1 
54 Nestle  Dryers Dean 124  0 
55 Allied  Waste  Browning 
Ferris 
Republic & Waste 
Management  66 0 
56 AT&T  TCI Sprint  146  1.6 













58 Alltel  Western 
Wireless 
sprint Nextel & 
MCI  77 8.7 
60 Watson  Andrx Teva  206  4.2 
61 GE  Invision None  297 7.4 
62 Abbitti  Bowater Weyerhaueser  261  0 
63 Monsanto  Pine Land  Dow  69  0 
64  Excelon 
PSEG  PJM East  Con Edison  82  0 
65  Marquee 
Holdings 
LCE 
(Loews)  None 531  0 
66 Linde  BOC  Praxair & Air 
Products  157 0 
67 McClatchy  Knight  Ridder None 591  
68 Quest  Unilab Lab  corp  107  0 
69 CBS  American 
Radio  clear channel  708  0 
70 Cardinal  Bergen Amerisource  802  0 
71 McKeeson  Amerisource  Bergen 
Brunswick  629 0 
72  Northwest Continental  American & 
Southwest  96 0 
73  GE Innoserv Siemens  1912  0 
74  Commscope Andrew  Powerwave Tech. 
& Arch Wireless  322 5.2 
75  Capstar Triathlon  none  152  0 
76  AT&T Dobson  none  544  0 
77  Thermo 
Electron 
Fisher 
Scientific  Beckman 5.25  .7 
78  Reckitt Benckiser  Clorox  30.6  0 
79  Provident Unum  Aetna  218  0 
80  Medtronic Avecor  Baxter  202  8.3 
81 Medtronic  Physio 
Control  Zoll 130  12 
82 El  Paso  Sonat  Atmos & 
Alleghany  65 0 
83 CSC  Mynd  None  398  0 
84 Agrium UAP  None  90  0 
85 Thomson  Reuter       
86  Conoco  Philips  Valero & Chevron  39.7  .1 
87  Smithkline Beecham Astra Zeneca & 
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Tables and Figures 
for 
Effect of R&D and Market Concentration on Merger Outcomes – An Event 





Table 1:  Expected Sign of Abnormal Returns and Rationale per Event Type 




to Merging Firms 
Abnormal Returns to 
Rival Firms 
Market Power 






















Zero or positive 




Table 2:  Breakdown of 2
nd Requests and Merger Challenges  
 
Type  DOJ  FTC  Total 
Merger Challenges  232  208  440 
2







Table 3:  Expected Sign of Abnormal Returns and Rationale Relative to 
R&D Intensity 
 
  Probability Enhancing  




to Merging Firms 






















Spillover effects of R&D  Negative 
(Positive) 
Zero or Insignificant 
 
 
Table 3:  Results - Abnormal Returns to Announcements  
 
  Target  Bidder  Rivals 
3-day CAR (-1,1)  22.6%***   -1.03%**  0.59%* 
Z score  11.82  -2.40   1.73 
5-day CAR (-2,2)  22.9%***  -1.16%***  0.68% * 
Z score  13.76  -2.62  1.76 
N 87  79  75 





Table 4:  Results - Abnormal Returns to Announcement Due to Change in HHI 







CAR (-1 , 1)  Target  Bidder  Rivals 
  Log R&D   .050**  -.0002  -.003 
  t-stat
14 1.98   -.52  -.62 
  Log  ∆ HHI   .025**  .040  .012 
  t-stat  1.97  .82  1.31 
constant   .020  .025  -.050 
Adj. R
2 .084    .016  .04 
N 87  79  74 
legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01       
 
Table 5:  Results - Abnormal Returns to Announcement Due to Change in HHI 




CAR (-2 , 2)  Target  Bidder  Rivals 
Log R&D   063**  .0004   .004 
t-stat 2.43  .57  -1.18 
Log ∆ HHI   .029**  .012  .006 
t-stat 2.06  1.37  -1.64 
constant  .023  -.072  .04 
Adj. R
2 .1235    .03  .03 
   N  87  79  74 
legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01       
 
 
























CAR (1,1)  1.6%***  .49%  .20%   -4.6%*** -.85%*  -.33% 
Z Score  3.87 1.23 .65  -3.09 -1.69  .71 
CAR (2,2)   1.5%***   .28%  -.15%  -5.2%*** -.77%  -.17% 
Z Score  3.83 .79 .58  -3.98 -1.06  .39 
N  65 57  57   19  19  16 
legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01      
 
                                                 




Table 7:  Results - Abnormal Returns to the Merger Complaint / Resolution 
Relative to Change in HHI and R&D for 3 Day CARs 
 





Target  Bidder  Rivals  Target  Bidder  Rivals 
Log R&D   -.016  -.01  .0032*** -.028  -.024**  -.002 
  t-stat  (-.41)  (-1.39)  (2.61)  (-1.49) (-2.29)  (-.96) 
Log ∆ HHI   -.001  -.01  .0027  -.024  -.01  -.011*** 
  t-stat  (1.05)  (-.11)  (1.21)  (-1.45) (-.09) (-6.01) 
Constant .019 .02 -.018  .104 -.01 .064 
Adj. R
2 .0176  .02    .1486 .1975 .28 .4479 
N 65  57  57  19 19 16 
 
Table 8:  Results - Abnormal Returns to the Merger Complaint / Resolution Relative 
to Change in HHI and R&D for 5 Day CARs 
 




Target  Bidder  Rivals  Target  Bidder  Rivals 
  Log R&D   -.003  -.01  .0109*** -1.49  -.02*  -.017 
  t-stat  (-.64)  (-.81)  3.14   (-1.31) (-2.30) (-.27) 
 Log ∆ HHI   -.0008  -.01  .0012  -1.45  .01  -.012** 
    t-stat  (-.22)  (-.12)  (.36)   (-1.52)  (.15)  (-2.34) 
Constant  .027  .02  -.0166  .093 -.03  -.059 
Adj. R
2 .011  .01  .1634  .1568 .27 .1220 






Table 9:  Results – Pattern of Abnormal Returns by Event Among Merging Firms 
and Rivals 
  Merging firms  Rivals 
Event  Abnormal 
Returns 











Bidder:  1.03%*** 
to  1.16%**   
Target:   
 R&D:  (+)*** 
∆HHI:  (+)*** 
Bidder:    
Not significant 
+ .59%* to 






Bidder:  .28% to 
.49% 
Target:   
Not significant 
Bidder:   
Not significant 
- .15%  to 
.2% 
 
R&D:  (+)*** 





Target:   -4.6*** to 
           -5.2%*** 
 
Bidder:  .77%* to  
            -.85%**  
Target:   
Not significant 
Bidder:   
R&D:  ( - )** 
∆HHI:   
Not significant 
-.17 to .33%  
 
R&D:  Not 
significant 














Non-R&D intensive  





R&D Intensive  
















Table 11:  Results – Abnormal Returns Per Event Relative to the Change in HHI 
and R&D Intensity 
 








Target  Rivals 
Announcement   -0.001       -0.01      Announcement   0.014      -0.058      
  t-stat  (-0.02 )      (-0.32)        t-stat  (0.20)      (-1.39)   
Complaint   0.072       0.038*     Complaint   0.112      0.039      
  t-stat  (1.10)      (1.95)         t-stat  (1.64)      (1.22)   
Resolution    0.0206      -0.0002    Resolution   0.0461**   -0.019      
  t-stat  (1.03)      (-0.01)       t-stat  (2.40)      (-0.96) 
Log R&D & 
Announcement  0.038        -0.001      Log R&D & 
Announcement 0.0657**   -0.002      
  t-stat  (1.44)      (-0.31)        t-stat  (2.53)      (-0.39)   
Log R&D & 
Complaint  -0.0279      . -0.0035     Log R&D & 
Complaint  -0.0304     -0.0032     
  t-stat  (-1.64)     (-1.11)        t-stat  (-1.59)     (-0.45) 
Log R&D & 
Resolution  -0.0007      . 
0.0081***  
Log R&D & 
Resolution  -0.0024    0.0110***  
  t-stat   (-0.17)      (2.74)         t-stat  (0.47)      (3.08)   
Log ∆ HHI & 
Announcement  0.0312***   0.0031      Log ∆ HHI & 
Announcement 0.0308**   0.0129     
  t-stat  (2.76)       (0.55)         t-stat  (2.17)      (1.63)   
Log ∆ HHI & 
Complaint  -0. 0175     -0.0066*     Log ∆ HHI & 
Complaint 
-
0.0266**   -0.0057     
  t-stat  (-1.48)      (-1.91)        t-stat  (-2.17)     (-1.00)   
Log ∆ HHI & 
Resolution  0.0002      -0.0011     Log ∆ HHI & 
Resolution  0.0048     0.0011     
t-stat  (0.04)      (-0.38)      t-stat  (-1.31)     (0.27) 
Adj. R
2  0.405        0.0364      Adj. R
2  0.512      0.071      
N 170  146  N 170  146 
 
 